

# The Bieber Project

*Ad Tech and Fraud 101*

*Mark Ryan Talabis, zvelo*

# Introduction

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- Chief Security Scientist, zvelo
  - Ad Tech Fraud Research
- Formerly, Cloud Email Threat Protection, Fireeye
- Alumni Member, Honeyynet Project
  - Honeypots/Honeyynets
- Author, Elsevier-Syngress
  - Information Security Analytics/Risk Management

# Main Topics

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- The Business and Currency of Digital Advertising
- Ad Tech: The Ecosystem
- The Ad Fraud Problem
- Publisher-based Ad Fraud
- Non Human Traffic and the Bieber Project

# The Business of Digital Advertising

Total digital ad spend is estimated to be

**\$60 billion** in 2015

## US Total Online, Online Display and Real-Time-Bidding-Based Online Display Ad Spending, 2010-2015


billions and % change

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Total online ad sales</b>	<b>\$30.2</b>	<b>\$34.4</b>	<b>\$40.6</b>	<b>\$47.2</b>	<b>\$54.7</b>	<b>\$62.4</b>
<b>% change</b>	<b>14.1%</b>	<b>13.8%</b>	<b>17.9%</b>	<b>16.5%</b>	<b>15.8%</b>	<b>14.1%</b>
<b>Online display ad sales</b>	<b>\$9.6</b>	<b>\$10.9</b>	<b>\$12.6</b>	<b>\$14.5</b>	<b>\$16.8</b>	<b>\$18.9</b>
<b>% change</b>	<b>27.9%</b>	<b>13.5%</b>	<b>16.1%</b>	<b>15.3%</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>
<b>RTB-based online display ad sales</b>	<b>\$0.4</b>	<b>\$1.1</b>	<b>\$2.0</b>	<b>\$2.9</b>	<b>\$3.9</b>	<b>\$5.1</b>
<b>% change</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>203.0%</b>	<b>85.1%</b>	<b>48.0%</b>	<b>35.1%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>

Source: International Data Corporation (IDC) as cited in PubMatic, "Ad Revenue Report: Controlling Your Brand's Future," Oct 13, 2011

133475

www.eMarketer.com




# The Currency of Digital Advertising


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- Primary metric: the number of delivered, or served, impressions
- Primary problem: Not all online ads delivered actually have an opportunity to be seen
- Advertisers are obviously not interested in paying for ads that were never seen

# The Currency of Digital Advertising




# The Business of Digital Advertising



Reference: ComScore


## Supply and Demand



# The Business of Digital Advertising



TV




Online  
Advertising






# Ad Tech: The Ecosystem

Let's go through the 101 version...




# Process of Serving an Ad


## 1. Campaign Setup



## 2. The Bidding Process



## 3. Ad Serving



# The Ad Fraud Problem

- Deliberate practice of attempting to serve ads that have no potential to be viewed by a human user
- Lots of varying statistics regarding the extent of the problem.
- Estimates range from 13% to as high as 60% of impressions served online were “suspicious”.
- What are we doing about it?



# Interactive Advertising Bureau

- What is the IAB?
- Doing good things but sometimes a bit confusing to us people in security
- Released a Ad Fraud Taxonomy



# IABs Ad Fraud Taxonomy

- **Illegitimate and Non-Human Traffic Sources**
  - Hijacked device
  - Crawler masquerading as a legitimate user
  - Data-center traffic
- **Non-traditional / other traffic**
  - Proxy traffic
  - Non-browser User-Agent header
  - Browser pre-rendering
- **Hijacked Tags**
  - Ad Tag Hijacking
  - Creative Hijacking
- **Site Impression Attributes**
  - Auto-Refresh
  - Ad Density
  - Hidden Ads
  - Viewability
  - Misappropriated Content
  - Falsely Represented
  - Non Brand Safe
  - Contains Malware
- **Ad creative / other**
  - Cookie Stuffing

# 101: What it Really Means

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*There are basically 3 main types of Ad Fraud:*

- 1 Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count
- 2 Illegal or Malicious Content
- 3 Use of Non Human Traffic to Increase Impressions

# Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count


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- Various techniques that publishers use to make 1 impression look like more!
- Some prominent examples are:
  - 1x1 Pixels
  - Ad Stacking
  - Gray Areas: Ad Clutter, Auto-play Videos




# Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count

Typically  
advertisers will  
want to see this:




# Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count

But some publishers  
will do this  
(Hidden Ads):



# Publisher Tricks to Increase Impression Count

Or this (Ad Stacking):




# Illegal or Malicious Content

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- There are times when fraud doesn't directly mean increasing impressions (though it could end up that way)
- Some prominent examples are:
  - Serving malware or adware
  - Scams and Non Brand Safe

# Illegal or Malicious Content


- Next few slides are from an investigation of malware-infected traffic exhibiting ad fraudulent tendencies
- The Ad Network itself was serving “dirty” inventory or at the very least “low quality” content




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http://safebrowsing-cache.google.com/safebrowsing/rd/
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gBEK30CxitzsgAUoMCAEQlb4L6JW-
CyABSgwiARCBvgsYgb4LIAFKDAGBEMa9CxiGv0sgAUoMCAEQvL0LGLy9CyABSgwiARCMvQsYfL0LIAFKDAoBEIa8Cx
iHvAsgAUoMCAEQ0bsLNG7CyABSgwiARCLuwsYpbsLIAFKDAGBEK7CxiGuwsgAUoMCAEQ
uQsYr7kLIAFKDAgAEP4FRiS-hUgAQ
http://expendablesearch.com/bg.gif
http://expendablesearch.com/top.gif
http://expendablesearch.com/search.php?q=stiff+knee
http://BB.214.193.211/click?sid=5659cddd2659faa41d5d0b9227f2c9d2972f20cf
http://www.theoads.com/re.php?
mid=15465880e6335f&m=aHR0cDovL3d3dy50aGVvYWRzLmNvbS9maWw0ZXIucGhw&tu=95f
http://www.theoads.com/filter.php?mid=15465880e6335f&tu=95834
http://r8ojabrniw.xcboxnmb.com/in/t2/?id=intads&campid=ld2ypphxz&gliv
http://umjk1pt9cx.sdobinxsb.net/ljetavtpbb
http://clients1.google.com.ph/complete/search?client=chrome&hl=en-US&q=
http://www.google.com.ph/search?aq=f&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=1577
http://www.google.com.ph/xjs/_/js/k=xjs.s.en.bcI-F_MCM7o.0/
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rs=AIrSTMFbZNFsQqobfeel187DIQnUbu6ew
http://www.google.com.ph/xjs/_/js/k=xjs.s.en.bcI-F_MCM7o.0/
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```

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
# Illegal or Malicious Content




Ad network was serving malware!




# Illegal or Malicious Content




Adware  
Ads that will serve you more Ads



# Illegal or Malicious Content



## Scamvertising!





# Use of Non Human Traffic to Increase Impressions

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- Bots! This is probably the most common thing that comes to mind.
- Non Human Traffic or NHT can be more than bots though.

What is the best way to investigate this?

# Buying Internet Traffic


---

What is  
Purchased  
Internet Traffic  
made of?



Can I buy  
internet traffic  
and get away  
with it?


# The Bieber Project



# Honeypot




Bieber with a "Wire"



Collected Information




Fraudulent Impressions?




# Bieber with A Wire

```
20
27 <script>
28
29 var fp1 = new Fingerprint();
30 var fp2 = new Fingerprint({canvas: true});
31 var fp3 = new Fingerprint({ie_activex: true});
32 var fp4 = new Fingerprint({screen_resolution: true});
33
34 var BrowserFingerprint1 = fp1.get()
35 var BrowserFingerprint2 = fp2.get()
36 var BrowserFingerprint3 = fp3.get()
37 var BrowserFingerprint4 = fp4.get()
38
39 var UserAgent = navigator.userAgent;
40 var BrowserCodeName = navigator.appCodeName;
41 var BrowserName = navigator.appName;
42 var BrowserVersion = navigator.appVersion;
43 var CookiesEnabled = navigator.cookieEnabled;
44 var BrowserLanguage = navigator.language;
45 var BrowserOnline = navigator.onLine;
46 var BrowserPlatform = navigator.platform;
47 var BrowserGeo = getLocation();
48 var BrowserProduct = navigator.product;
49 var JavaEnabled = navigator.javaEnabled();
50
51 var HistoryLength = history.length;
52 var WindowInnerWidth = window.innerWidth;
53 var WindowInnerHeight = window.innerHeight;
54 var WindowOuterWidth = window.outerWidth;
55 var WindowOuterHeight = window.outerHeight;
56 var WindowPageXOffset = window.pageXOffset;
57 var WindowPageYOffset = window.pageYOffset;
58 var WindowScreenX = window.screenX;
59 var WindowScreenY = window.screenY;
60 var WindowTop = topWindows();
61 var WindowName = window.name;
62
63 var AlterInnerWidth = window.innerWidth || document.documentElement.clientWidth || document.body.clientWidth;
64 var AlterInnerHeight = window.innerHeight || document.documentElement.clientHeight || document.body.clientHeight;
65
66 var LocationHost = location.host;
67 var LocationHostName = location.hostname;
68 var LocationHash = location.hash;
69 var LocationHref = location.href;
```



# Data Stored for Analysis



The image displays a browser window with the address bar showing 'justinfan.zerodays.org'. The page content includes the title 'Justin Bieber Ultimate Fan Blog' and a photograph of Justin Bieber. Below the browser window, a log file named 'ntlog.txt' is open, showing a detailed record of browser fingerprinting data. A large green arrow points from the browser window to the log file, indicating the source of the data.

```
ntlog.txt
1306440463|3863302194|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89
(Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89 Safari/537.36|true|en-
665|1350|737|0|0|0|23|true|justinfan.zerodays.org|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|
7/2015 @ 9:35:28|-480|7|Widevine Content Decryption Module*Shockwave Flash*Chrome Remote Desktop Viewer*Native Client*Chrome PDF
iner*Default Browser Helper*10|application/x-ppapi-widevine-cdm*application/x-shockwave-
ication/vnd.chromium.remoting-viewer*application/x-nacl*application/x-pnacl*application/pdf*|http://justinfan.zerodays.org/| SERVER SIDE
.168.192.50|justinfan.zerodays.org|Apache|HTTP/1.1|GET|1426556129|/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/*/*|gzip, deflate, sdch|en-
odays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/justinfan/record.php|support@supportwebsite.com|80|/record.php|
1306440463|3863302194|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89
(Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89 Safari/537.36|true|en-
625|1350|741|0|0|0|23|true|justinfan.zerodays.org|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|
7/2015 @ 13:19:33|-480|7|Widevine Content Decryption Module*Shockwave Flash*Chrome Remote Desktop Viewer*Native Client*Chrome PDF
iner*Default Browser Helper*10|application/x-ppapi-widevine-cdm*application/x-shockwave-
/vnd.chromium.remoting-viewer*application/x-nacl*application/x-pnacl*application/pdf*|http://justinfan.zerodays.org/| SERVER SIDE
0|justinfan.zerodays.org|Apache|HTTP/1.1|GET|1426569574|/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/*/*|gzip, deflate, sdch|en-
://justinfan.zerodays.org|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/justinfan/record.php|support@supportwebsite.com|80|/record.php|
CLIENT SIDE |1306440463|2553523113|3863302194|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89
Safari/537.36|Mozilla|Netscape|5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89 Safari/537.36|true|en-
US|true|MacIntel|Gecko|true|3|1350|625|1350|741|0|0|0|23|true|justinfan.zerodays.org|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|
|http://|741|1366|24|768|1366|24|3|17|2015 @ 13:19:33|-480|7|Widevine Content Decryption Module*Shockwave Flash*Chrome Remote Desktop Viewer*Native Client*Chrome PDF
Viewer*WebEx64 General Plugin Container*Default Browser Helper*10|application/x-ppapi-widevine-cdm*application/x-shockwave-
Flash*application/futuresplash*application/vnd.chromium.remoting-viewer*application/x-nacl*application/x-pnacl*application/pdf*| SERVER SIDE
|122.53.157.210|57281|CGI/1.1|184.168.192.50|justinfan.zerodays.org|Apache|HTTP/1.1|GET|1426570377|/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/*/*|gzip, deflate, sdch|en-
US,en;q=0.8|keep-alive|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/41.0.2272.89 Safari/537.36|/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/justinfan/record.php|support@supportwebsite.com|80|/record.php|
CLIENT SIDE |1938211362|595198427|1938211362|281935577|1938211362|281935577|Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1866.237
Safari/537.36|Mozilla|Netscape|5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1866.237
Safari/537.36|true|true|Win32|Gecko|false|1|300|3483|140|39|0|0|0|0|false|siteframe|justinfan.zerodays.org|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|http://j
stinfan.zerodays.org|/|http://|728|1024|32|768|1024|32|3|17|2015 @ 5:33:14|0|0|0|0|http://www.universal-traffic.com/7VFJDSz0IMTI=| SERVER SIDE
|94.31.157.165|45041|CGI/1.1|184.168.192.50|justinfan.zerodays.org|Apache|HTTP/1.1|GET|1426570394|/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/*/*|iso-8859-1,*,utf-
8|gzip,deflate|vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,fr-FR;q=0.6,fr;q=0.4,en-US;q=0.2,en;q=0.2,de;q=0.2|keep-alive|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT
5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1866.237
Safari/537.36|/home/content/r/y/a/ryantalabis/html/justinfan/record.php|support@supportwebsite.com|80|/record.php|
CLIENT SIDE |1875004711|94940604|1875004711|758059013|Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89
Safari/537.36|Mozilla|Netscape|5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2272.89 Safari/537.36|true|en-
US|true|Win32|Gecko|true|1|0|1|1050|708|0|0|-47|473|false|siteframe|justinfan.zerodays.org|justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays.org|http://justinfan.zerodays
.org|/|http://|728|1366|24|768|1366|24|3|17|2015 @ 18:33:55|-780|18|Widevine Content Decryption Module*Shockwave Flash*Chrome Remote Desktop Viewer*Native Client*Chrome PDF
Viewer*Microsoft Office 2010*Google Earth Plugin*Picasa*Google Update*Java Deployment Toolkit 7.0.600.19*Java(TM) Platform SE 7 U60*VLC Web Plugin*Windows Live#153; Photo
Gallery*Facebook Video Calling Plugin*BrowserPlus (From Yahoo!) v2.9.8*Shockwave for Director*Shockwave Flash*Silverlight Plug-In*106|application/x-ppapi-widevine-
cdm*application/x-shockwave-flash*application/futuresplash*application/vnd.chromium.remoting-viewer*application/x-nacl*application/x-pnacl*application/pdf*application/x-
google-chrome-print-preview-pdf*application/x-sharepoint*application/goplugin*application/x-picasa-detect*application/x-vnd.google.update3webcontrol.3*application/x-
```

# Traffic Vendors



[HOME](#) [ABOUT US](#) [REVIEWS](#) [RESELLER](#) [AFFILIATE PROGRAM](#) [FAQ](#) [CONTACT US](#)

[Client Home](#) [Order Now](#) [Announcements](#) [Features List](#)

## Buy Website Traffic

Are you looking for the easiest way to get a huge traffic boost on your website? Maxvisits.com is here to meet your needs! We can deliver traffic from 45 different countries, targeted for your site category, from as low as \$1 per 1,000 visitors.

That's right, our cheap traffic will bring you targeted visitors, customers, rankings improvement and most importantly real web traffic. Your site will be the proud recipient of a steady flow of website visitors, and this will finally lead to your success as a site owner.

There are plenty of businesses online that offer to buy website traffic, but not all of them are going to be beneficial to your website. We offer top level visitors to your site for the best prices and we will not fail you.

*We have provided **1,486,225,000** visitors to our loyal customers!*

# Traffic Vendors



The No.1 choice for buying web traffic!

Log in

Free sign up

Home

Visit traffic

Click traffic

Targeted traffic

Reviews

More service

Member center

**\$9.99**

25,000 unique visitors  
(3,000-4,000 unique  
visitors per day for  
7 days!)

**Bulk  
Traffic**

Up to 55,000  
unique visitors  
per day

**Clicks**

For votes,  
ads, links...

100% real visitors from 24-hour unique ips

Refund guaranteed

Excellent customer service

0% risk to skyrocket your web traffic





# Traffic Vendors

 Home | Check Stats | About Us | How It Works | FAQ | Affiliates | Contact Us  
Guaranteed Traffic To Your Website. Today.

Welcome to   
Guaranteed Website Traffic by eTraffic247 | fic To Your Website. Today.

Increase Your Website Stats 

- ✓ Increase Your Website Traffic Today
- ✓ Boost Sales and Affiliate Signups
- ✓ Increase Your Alexa Ranking
- ✓ Real-Time Traffic Stats

**Limited Time Offer - Get 10,000 Free Visitors With All Orders**

Click Below to Order A Traffic Package Today and Watch Your Website Traffic Explode!!

 <b>25,000</b> Guaranteed Visitors \$9.95 <b>ORDER NOW</b>	 <b>100,000</b> Guaranteed Visitors \$17.95 <b>ORDER NOW</b>	 <b>Best Seller</b> <b>250,000</b> Guaranteed Visitors \$39.95 <b>ORDER NOW</b>
--	--	--

# Traffic Vendors

The screenshot displays the VisitorZoom website interface. At the top left is the logo for VisitorZoom, featuring a stylized mouse cursor icon. To the right of the logo is a navigation menu with the following items: How It Works, Order, Testimonials, Compare, FAQ, Support, Blog, and Members. Below the navigation is a horizontal progress bar with five steps: Order, Login, Review, Payment, and Receipt. The 'Order' step is highlighted in blue, and a large blue arrow points downwards from it. Below the progress bar is a text box with an information icon and the following text: "You can customize and set up your own traffic campaign below. We offer dozens to choose from, 1,000 visitors to 250,000 visitors, VisitorZoom will give your site the boost it needs. Just setup a campaign, sit back, and watch new targeted visitors arrive to your site!". Below this text box is a section titled "1 Choose amount of visitors" with a question mark icon. This section contains a list of visitor options: 1,000 visitors, 2,500 visitors, 5,000 visitors, and 10,000 visitors. To the right of the list is a dark blue box containing the text "ORDER TOTAL: \$0.00" and an orange "Checkout" button with a shopping cart icon. To the right of the checkout box are four green buttons: "TRIAL", "SAVE 20%", "SAVE 30%", and "SAVE 38%".

visitorzoom™

How It Works Order Testimonials Compare FAQ Support Blog Members

Order Login Review Payment Receipt

**i** You can customize and set up your own traffic campaign below. We offer dozens to choose from, 1,000 visitors to 250,000 visitors, VisitorZoom will give your site the boost it needs. Just setup a campaign, sit back, and watch new targeted visitors arrive to your site!

**1** Choose amount of visitors ?

1,000 visitors ~~\$6.80~~

2,500 visitors

5,000 visitors

10,000 visitors \$49.79

ORDER TOTAL: **\$0.00**

Checkout

TRIAL


SAVE 20%

SAVE 30%

SAVE 38%

# What is Purchased Internet Traffic Made Of?





Well..obviously **BOTS!**

(partly)



---

# How do we know?

Clues are in the  
Impression...




# What are the Clues...?

Geo	Product	InnerWid	InnerHeig	OuterWid	OuterHeig	PageXOff	PageYOff	ScreenX	ScreenY	WindowTop	Plugin	MimeTyp	RemoteAddress
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86
Geolocation is not supported by this browser.										FALSE		0	0 122.227.163.86

## Lots of other suspicious information...

- No Plugins
- No Mime Types
- Invisible Viewport Sizes
- Zero Page and Mouse Coordinates
- No Product Identifiers




It's easy to catch "dumb" bots but  
what about the smarter ones?




# A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots

This is a video demonstration of a malware that hijacks a user's browser.




# A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots

This is a video demonstration to show a stealthier ad fraud malware.



# A Closer Look @ Smarter Bots


This is a video demonstration showing a smarter malware that reproduces user events



# What are the Clues...?

For hijacked machines, we need to do some trends analysis...

Example: Frequency between visits are too fast



# What are the Clues...?

You'll need to look at broader patterns...

113.76.124.240	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
182.37.148.240	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
117.150.121.79	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
222.186.27.44	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
94.176.202.83	RO Romania	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
130.211.68.68		 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
113.76.124.240	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
117.150.121.79	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
218.71.140.74	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
182.37.149.52	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
222.186.27.44	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
119.183.67.87	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
218.71.140.74	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
119.183.67.87	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
60.248.224.199	TW Taiwan	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
124.167.242.50	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
183.63.21.221	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
60.248.224.199	TW Taiwan	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
219.137.167.180	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
61.147.79.69	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
124.167.242.50	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
183.63.21.221	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
61.147.79.69	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
219.137.167.180	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>
116.236.148.218	CN China	 <a href="#">whois</a> <a href="#">hostname</a>

Example: Doesn't help that almost all of the traffic was coming from one IP block from China...

# User Events

Show video of user event collection...



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying `www.zerodays.org/prototag/`. The page title is "Justin Bieber Ultimate Fan Blog". On the left side of the page is a large portrait of Justin Bieber. On the right side, a black overlay displays user event data in red and blue text. The data includes:

- Total Time in Page: 48 seconds
- Scroll Events :0
- Element Hovered: BODY
- X Mouse Location: 478
- Y Mouse Location: 360
- Time Hover Started: 35 sec
- Text: Total Time in Page: 35...
- Per Element Statistics:
- BODY : 13 mouseovers | 1 clicks | 10 sec | 'Total Time in Page: 5...'
- BODY/IMG[1] : 2 mouseovers | 1 clicks | 5 sec | '...'
- BODY/P[1] : 4 mouseovers | 0 clicks | 0 sec | 'Welcome to the fastest, largest...'
- BODY/P[2] : 4 mouseovers | 1 clicks | 3 sec | 'Justin Bieber closed the 11th...'
- BODY/P[3] : 4 mouseovers | 1 clicks | 6 sec | 'Justin Bieber and Canadian tennis...'
- BODY/P[3]/A[2] : 3 mouseovers | 0 clicks | 1 sec | 'Eugenie Bouchard...'
- Selected Text: 'Will Ferrell' 'Will Ferrell' 'Canadian' 'Eugenie Bouchard'

Below the image, the page content includes a welcome message, a paragraph about the 11th Annual Desert Smash tennis tournament, and a paragraph about Justin Bieber and Eugenie Bouchard.

---

**BUT it's also made of  
HUMANS...**

Who for all intents and purposes do  
not know they are visiting your site


# Traffic is delivered to you through:

- Pop-unders
- Pop-ups
- Frames

Traffic Vendor



Your Site



Justin Bieber Ultimate Fan Blog




Partner Site




# What are the Clues...?

70% of the viewports are 1 pixel!




Meaning the size of the browsers viewing your site looks like this:



# What are the Clues...?

The window is not the active window:

InnerWidth	InnerHeight	WindowTitle	RemoteAddress
0	0	FALSE	128.1.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	62.151.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	95.128.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	125.255.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	78.81.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	95.30.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	94.130.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	37.76.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	36.81.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	178.17.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	46.41.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	85.255.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	45.32.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	45.32.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	45.32.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	193.50.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	5.14.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	91.229.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	31.81.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	5.18.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	77.244.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	98.234.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	98.234.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	92.51.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	188.166.1.170.131
0	0	FALSE	145.239.1.170.131



Your site is here

So...can I buy internet traffic  
and get away with it?





# Depends.

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- If an advertiser will audit the traffic and they know what to look for, you will get caught.
- If they don't or if they don't know what to look for, you won't get caught.
- The "quality" of traffic is also directly proportional to how much you pay for it.
  - The lower prices, you'll get bots.
  - The higher prices, you'll get frames, popups or pop-unders.

# If you liked my presentation

- Visit us at [zvelo.com](http://zvelo.com)
- Check out my books: (available on Amazon)



**z v e l o**

We categorize the Web

[www.zvelo.com](http://www.zvelo.com)