
# Staying Persistent in Software Defined Networks



DefCon 23, Las Vegas 2015



## **Hellfire Security**

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#### **Overview**

- **\* White Box Ethernet**
- **\* Stupid Is As Stupid Does!**
- **# Exploiting it!**
- **\* Moving Forward**
- **# Wrapping Up**



#### What Is It?


- Standard Hardware ("Blank" Slate)
- Running Merchant Silicon
  - **Trident and Broadcom Chipsets**
  - Intel, AMD, and PowerPC processors
- Common Operating System (Often Linux-Based)
- Critical for Software Defined Networking
- **# Can Be Used Without It!**





## Why Do It?

- Reduced Cost
- **# Flexibility**
- **Gontrol** 
  - **# Traditional**
  - **DevOps**
  - **Software Defined Networking**





## Open Compute Project

- **\* Started By Facebook**
- Total Redesign of Existing Technology To Meet Emerging Needs
- Specifications for Server,Storage, and the Data Center
- Designed to be efficient, to be inexpensive, and to be easy to service





## Open Compute Project

- **\* Vanity Free and Minimalistic**
- Not Tied To Brands or Anything Proprietary
- **\* Components Are Abstracted**
- Therefore ... Interchangeable





## Open Network Install Environment (ONIE)

- Firmware for bare metal network switches
- Boot Loader for Network Operating Systems (NOS)
  - Grub/U-Boot Underneath
  - **#** Facilitates Installation and Removal of NOS
- Comes Pre-Installed
- Automates Switch Deployment





#### White Box Ethernet and ONIE



What Could Go Wrong?



- Privileged Accounts
  - **No Root Password**
  - **Doesn't Force You To Change It!**
- Management Services
  - **4** Uses Telnet
  - **# SSH** 
    - Installation Mode (18-bits Entropy)
    - Recovery Mode (26-bits Entropy)





### Weaknesses (Installer)

- Predictable URLS
  - **Exact URLs from DHCPv4**
  - **4** Inexact URLs based on DHCP Response
  - **# IPv6 Neighbors**
  - **# TFTP Waterfall**
- **\* Predictable File Name Search Order**
- No Encryption or Authentication for Installs






## Weaknesses (Implementation)

- **Exposed Partition**
- **No Secure Boot**





#### What Does This Mean?



Lot's Of Opportunities to Blow It Up!



#### Here's How

- **Compromise It's Installations** 
  - **+Via Rogue DHCP Server**
  - **+Via IPv6 Neighbor**
  - **+Via TFTP**
- **4 Compromise It** 
  - **\*Forced Reboot Entry**
  - Sniffing/MiTM (Telnet or SSH)



#### Even Better

- **# Compromise It** 
  - **Get Past Network Operating System**
  - Modify ONIE
    - **\*Exposed Partition**
    - **\*No Secure Boot**
  - **Now You're In the Firmware ...**
  - **Now You're There Forever!**








## **Network Operating Systems (NOS)**

- **Gets Installed By ONIE**
- **# Operates the Switch**
- **ONIE-Compatible Distributions** 
  - **Open Network Linux**
  - **Switch Light**
  - **+ Cumulus Linux**
  - **MLNX-OS**



## Open Network Linux

- # Linux distribution for "bare metal" switches
- **Based On Debian Linux**
- Bare-Bones with No Features
- **\* Development Platform Only**
- Maintained by Open Compute Project





## Switch Light

- # Linux distribution for "bare metal" switches
- Packaged Open Network Linux
- Indigo Openflow Agent
- **# Extension of Big Switch Fabric (SDN)**
- Maintained by Big Switch Networks





#### **Cumulus Linux**

- **# Linux distribution for "bare metal"** switches
- **Based On Debian Linux**
- \* Puppet/Chef/Ansible Agent
- Network Automation and Orchestration (DevOps)
- Maintained by Cumulus Networks











#### MLNX-OS

- Linux distribution for "bare metal" switches
- Based On Enterprise Linux 5 (Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5)
- Puppet/Chef/Ansible/eSwitch Agent
- Network Automation and Orchestration (DevOps) or Controller (SDN)
- Maintained by Mellanox





## Weaknesses (Agent)

- No Encryption and No Authentication
  - **Switch Light (Indigo)**
  - MLNX-OS (eSwitch)
- **\* Out-Dated OpenSSL** 
  - Switch Light (Actually No SSL Used! WTF?)
  - $\bullet$  Cumulus Linux (OpenSSL 1.0.1e  $\rightarrow$  Puppet)
  - **MLNX-OS (OpenSSL 0.9.8e-fips-rhel5)**



#### Could Lead To ...

- Topology, Flow, and Message Modification through Unauthorized Access
  - Add Access

Switch Light (Indigo)

**Remove Access** 

MLNX-OS (eSwitch)

- **Hide Traffic**
- Change Traffic
- Information Disclosure through Exploitation

Cumulus Linux (Puppet)




## Weaknesses (Agent)

- **\* Running As Root** 
  - Switch Light (Indigo)
  - **Cumulus Linux (Puppet)**
- **+ Vulnerable Code** 
  - **\*Lot's of MEMCPY (Indigo)**



#### Could Lead To . . .



But Still, It's Kind Of Scary . . .



- **Dut-Dated Bash** 
  - Switch Light (Bash version 4.2.37)
  - Cumulus Linux (Bash version 4.2.37)
  - MLNX-OS (Bash version 3.2.9)



- Default (and Fixed) Privileged Accounts
  - **Switch Light** 
    - **#admin**
    - #root (hidden/disabled)
  - **+ Cumulus Linux** 
    - **#cumulus**
    - #root (disabled)
  - **#MLNX-OS** 
    - **+admin**
    - #root (hidden/disabled)



- Doesn't Force You To Change Default Passwords for Privileged Accounts
  - Switch Light (admin)
  - **Cumulus Linux (cumulus)**
  - MLNX-OS (admin)



- **# Easy Escape to Shell** 
  - Switch Light (enable, debug bash)
  - **+Cumulus Linux (N/A)**
  - MLNX-OS (shell escape)
- Instant Elevation
  - **Switch Light (N/A)**
  - **+ Cumulus Linux (sudo)**
  - **MLNX-OS** (su)

Remember that disabled root account?



#### Could Lead To ...

Full Control of Your Network through

**Unauthorized Access** 

- **\*Add Access**
- **Remove Access**
- **+ Hide Traffic**
- Change Traffic
- Compromise of Firmware through Unauthorized Access

Switch Light

**Cumulus Linux** 

**MLNX-OS** 


Switch Light

**Cumulus Linux** 

**MLNX-OS** 




#### Like So ...



admin:x:0:0::/root:/usr/bin/pcli



## **Exposed ONIE Partition**





## **Exposed ONIE Partition**


```
### 192.168.2.105 - PuTTY

### 192.168.2.105 - P
```



## Once More With Feeling!

	root@controller: /home/admin	- 8
login as: admin Big Cloud Fabric Appliance 2.6.0 (bcf-2.6.0 ‡2 Log in as 'admin' to configure		
admin@54.162.162.166's password: Last login: Thu May 28 02:19:32 2015 from 54.1 Big Cloud Fabric Appliance 2.6.0 (bcf-2.6.0 #2 Logged in as admin, 2015-05-28 11:36:31.055000 10.182.69.161> debug bash	265)	
****** WARNING	********	
Any/All activities within bash mode as This is intended ONLY for additional debugging		
Please type "exit" or Ctrl-D to ret	turn to the CLI	
************************ WARNING	************************	
admin@controller:~\$ su root@controller:/home/admin# []		
		9




## Why?

- Disabled Root Accounts Can Still Be Used If Logged In Already!
- **\* Just Need Shell Access**
- \*Since they are hidden from user, highly likely their passwords won't be set!
- # Just one "su", and you are in ...



#### This Means



Is One Key Logger Away!



### Scenario (Demo)

- End-User System (Windows)
  - Drive-By Web Attack/Phishing Email
  - Key Logging for Default Accounts
  - **SDN** Discovery (Southbound API)
  - Second Stage Attack
- Network Operating System (Linux)
  - Compromised Login
  - Plant and Start Binaries (Backdoor)



# Scenario (Demo)

- **ONIE** 
  - Planted Binaries Added
  - "onie-nos-install" Shell Script Modified
- **Wait! Our Switch Is Infected!** 
  - **Backdoor Accessible**
  - **•** Even from the Internet (Pivoting)



# Scenario (Demo)

- **# Environment Refresh** 
  - onie-nos-install Downloads And Executes nos Installer
  - **\*** Afterwards
    - **\* Adds Planted Binaries Back**
    - **Set's Run-Level!**
- **# Resurrection!** 
  - Backdoor Accessible
  - **# Even from the Internet (Pivoting)**



# Delivery (Demo)

- Metasploit Setup
  - use exploit/multi/browser/java\_jre17\_jmxbean
  - set EXE::Custom \path\to\Custom.exe
  - set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse\_https
- Drive-By
  - **Demo Site**
  - **# Click Link**
  - **\* Redirect to Known Good**



- Assumptions
  - Management Station (Windows-Based)
  - **Switch** 
    - **+** Linux-Based
    - **\* Southbound APIs Running**
  - Management Plane
    - **\* Not Accessible from Internet**
    - Accessible from Management Station



#### **• Methods (First Stage)**

- Scanning
  - **•** Openflow Ports (6633, 6653)
  - **\* SSH Banners**
- **Exploitation** 
  - **SSH Client**
  - Wrapper Escape Commands
- Binary Planted
  - Cross-Compiled for Demo-OS (netcat)
  - Delivered Via printf | dd
  - **+ Yes, I know It's Ugly!**



- **Methods (First Stage)** 
  - **ONIE Modified (Shell Commands Modify onie-nos-install)**
  - Pivot (Reverse HTTP)
- Methods (Second Stage) (netcat)



- **\* Development** 
  - First Stage
    - Python Script Compiled
    - Only Several Megabytes In Size
  - **\* Second Stage** 
    - netcat from source



#### **Demonstration**





# Malware (Improvements)

- First Stage (Additional Exploitation)
  - Bash
- Second Stage (Custom)
  - **Attacks** 
    - Network Modification and Manipulation
    - Attacks Against Loopback Services (Escalation)
  - **# Evasion** 
    - Recovery from ONIE Upgrade
    - **\* Various Linux ...**
  - **\* Worming**



### And Now Some Pwnage . . .



Sorry Cumulus Linux!



# **Zero-Day Exploit**

- Cumulus Linux Has Several Command-Line Tools
  - # cl-bgp, cl-ospf, cl-ospf6, cl-ra, and cl-rctl
  - Meant To Be Used By Reduced Privilege "admin"
  - Commands Processed By "clcmd-server.py" On Unix Sockets
- Command Injection Issues!
- **Boom Goes CLCMD-SERVER**
- And it runs as "Root"





# CLCMD-SERVER Running On A Switch

root	2015	0.0	0.0	11016	1308	3	Ss	21:15	0:00 /usr/sbin/lldpd -c
ntp	2088	0.0	0.1	6780	2092	?	Ss	21:15	0:00 /usr/sbin/ntpd -p /var/run/ntpd.pid -g -U0 -c /var/lib/ntp/ntp.c
_lldpd	2177	0.0	0.0	11016	1080	?	S	21:15	0:00 /usr/sbin/lldpd -c
root	2349	0.0	0.0	3276	624	3	Ss	21:15	0:00 /usr/sbin/ptmd -d -l INFO
root	2362	0.0	0.3	11124	6164	?	S	21:15	0:00 /usr/bin/python /usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/clcmd_server.py
root	2472	0.0	0.0	7840	1144	?	Ss	21:15	0:00 /usr/sbin/sshd
root	2586	0.0	0.0	3116	680	?	S	21:15	0:00 /bin/bash /usr/bin/arp_refresh
root	2613	0.0	0.2	11684	5036	?	S	21:15	0:00 /usr/bin/python /usr/lib/cumulus/ztp-usb
root	2742	0.0	0.0	14544	1672	3	SNI	21:15	0:01 /usr/bin/monit -p /var/run/monit.pid -s /var/run/monit/state -c
root	2876	0.0	0.0	2608	836	ttyS0	Ss+	21:15	0:00 /sbin/getty -L ttyS0 115200 vt100
root	2879	0.0	0.0	3116	680	?	S	21:15	0:00 /bin/bash /usr/bin/arp_refresh
quagga	4285	0.0	0.0	4252	1476	.5	S <s< td=""><td>21:32</td><td>0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/zebradaemon -A 127.0.0.1</td></s<>	21:32	0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/zebradaemon -A 127.0.0.1
quagga	4312	0.0	0.0	4700	1716	3	S <s< td=""><td>21:32</td><td>0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/ospfddaemon -A 127.0.0.1</td></s<>	21:32	0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/ospfddaemon -A 127.0.0.1
root	4337	0.0	0.0	3232	716	2	Ss	21:32	0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/watchquagga -adz -r /usr/sbin/servicebBquaggabBr



#### **Demonstration**





# **Exposed ONIE Partition**

```
cumulus@leaf1$ sudo dd if=/dev/mtdblock1 of=/tmp/onie_dump

$1392+0 records in
$192+0 records out

$194304 bytes (4.2 MB) copied, 2.22472 s, 1.9 MB/s

cumulus@leaf1$ cd /tmp

cumulus@leaf1$ ls -1

total 4096

-w-x--x-- 1 roct roct $19$30$ Apr 12 22:29 onie_dump

cumulus@leaf1$ []
```



#### Available Solutions

- **# Hardware**
- **# Install Environment**
- Network Operating Systems
- **4** Agents
- **\* Enterprise Architecture**



#### Hardware

- **\* Trusted Platform Module (TPM)**
- \* Rob Sherwood Had These Put In for Most x86-Based Switches
- **4.** Let's Add Them to the PowerPC Switches
- **#** Then, Let's Use Them!





#### Install Environment

- **\* Remove Telnet**
- **# Increase Key Entropy**
- **Force Password Change**
- **Remove IPv6 and TFTP Waterfall**
- **Sign the Installations**





# **Operating Systems**

- **Changeable Names** 
  - uid O accounts
  - "reduced" privilege accounts
- **•** Force Password Change
- **Tighten Shell Access** 
  - **Switch Light (Two-Factor Escape)**
  - Cumulus Linux (Wrapper)
  - MLNX-OS (Two-Factor Escape)





### **Agents**

- **# Use TLS**
- **\* Add Encryption and Authentication**
- **Use DevOps or SDN to Coordinate**Certificate and Key Distribution



# Enterprise Architecture

- **\* Isolate Management Plane** 
  - Rarely Done
  - What's wrong with Jump Boxes?
- **# Audit Switches** 
  - Password Changes
  - **ONIE Partition Hashes**



# Racing Ahead

- **# Impact On Security**
- **\* Keeping Pressure On Developers (Scaring Them)**
- Making The Difference



# Impact On Security

- Getting Products/Features To Market Is Important ... I get it. We all get it.
- But You're Not Learning
  - **Desktop Operating Systems**
  - Server Operating Systems
- **•** These Are Not New
- **# Wake Up!**



# Scaring Developers!

- So Begins The Spinning of the Merry-Go-Round
  - **We Hack It**
  - **4 You Fix It**
- **# Let The Clean-Up Begin**
- Is It So Hard To Hire Someone for Security
  - I thought fixing It later was more expensive?
  - Security Can Be A Feature Too



# Making The Difference

- Learn From Desktop and Server Operating Systems
- **4** Leverage Management Platforms (DevOps) or Controllers (SDN)
  - **Security Reference**
  - Audit Capability (Reconciliation)
  - **# Logging**
- **4** Logic Probes



# Final Thoughts

- **SDN** has the potential to turn the entire Internet into a cloud
- **Benefit would be orders of magnitude above what we see now**
- But there is hole in the middle of it that could easily be filled by the likes of the NSA ... or worse yet, China
- **•** Let's Not Let That Happen
- **4** And That Start's Here



#### Links

- http://etherealmind.com/network-dictionary-whitebrand-ethernet/
- https://github.com/opencomputeproject/onie/wiki/Quick-Start-Guide
- https://github.com/opencomputeproject/onie/wiki/CLI-Reference
- http://opennetlinux.org/docs/build
- http://opennetlinux.org/docs/deploy
- http://www.bigswitch.com/sdn-products/big-cloud-fabrictm
- http://www.bigswitch.com/products/switch-light
- http://labs.bigswitch.com
- https://github.com/floodlight/indigo
- https://github.com/floodlight/ivs
- http://docs.cumulusnetworks.com/
- http://cumulusnetworks.com/get-started/test-drive-open-networking/
- https://puppetlabs.com/blog/puppet-cumulus-linux



#### Links

- https://github.com/puppetlabs/puppet
- http://www.mellanox.com/page/minx\_os
- http://h20564.www2.hp.com/hpsc/swd/public/detail?swItemId = M TX\_8adfcbf6e0834d5a82564b4825
- https://github.com/mellanox-openstack/mellanox-eswitchd
- http://zeromq.org/intro:read-the-manual

